Ⅲ ABSTRACT: Th is article reviews two strengths of Melanesian anthropology that could make a signifi cant contribution to anthropological research on human-animal relations, specifi cally to multispecies ethnography. Th e fi rst strength is an analytical approach to comparative research on gender developed in response to challenges from feminist theory in the 1980s; the second is a wealth of ethnographic detail on human-animal relations, much of it contained in texts not explicitly concerned with them and thus largely inaccessible to nonspecialist readers. Th e article sets up an analogy between the challenges faced by feminist anthropologists and those currently faced by multispecies ethnographers. It demonstrates how pursuing the analogy allows multispecies ethnographers to draw together analytically, and to reinvestigate a broad range of ethnographic resources containing details on human-animal relations, whose convergence so far remains hidden by divergent theoretical interests.
One set of challenges arises from recent developments in the life sciences and has been debated primarily by anthropologists interested in kinship, gender, and genetics (e.g., Franklin 2007; Hayden 1995; Martin 1987) . Second, environmental concerns in public debates and new developments in ecological research have prompted increasing numbers of anthropologists to study the dynamic relations of humans and other organisms at the scale of ecosystems and landscapes since the 1990s. Th e fi eld of environmental anthropology is varied and developing fast, comprising research in historical and political ecology and on social-ecological systems, among others. Th ird, the limits of the human have all but disappeared in research in the physical and geo-sciences. Th e term "anthropocene" was coined by Crutzen and Stoermer (2000, cited in Kirksey and Helmreich 2010) for the current geological epoch, on the grounds that the entire planet is undergoing lasting change whose primary driving force is the agency of humans. Th ese challenges to the boundaries of the human at several scales resonate strongly with research within anthropology itself. Th ere is growing evidence from ethnographic research and anthropological theorizing that not only diff erences among humans, such as diff erences in gender or culture, but also species boundaries cannot be taken for granted. Th ey must be studied as emergent properties of "interspecies" relations (Tsing n.d.) . Th is, then, is the disciplinary situation in which human-animal relations are becoming a prominent subject matter in anthropological research. Several related projects are under way that address relations between humans and animals in order to help us rethink what it means to be human. Kirksey and Helmreich use the label "multispecies ethnography, " Kohn (2007) proposes an "anthropology of life. "
Anthropologists working on Melanesia have already contributed to research exploring challenges to the boundaries of the human in kinship (e.g., Bamford 2007; Konrad 2005; Strathern 1992a Strathern , 1992b and have made important and diverse contributions to environmental anthropology (see Bulmer 1967 Bulmer , 1968 Bulmer and Majnep 1978; Hide 1984 Hide , 2003 Kirsch 2006b; Rappaport 1968; Majnep and Bulmer 1977; Sillitoe 2003; West 2006) . Th ere is a growing interest among them in making their own ethnography and theoretical resources speak to the more comprehensive projects of multispecies ethnography. Th is article focuses on one possibility for bringing ethnographic and conceptual resources from Melanesian anthropology into multispecies ethnography, and vice versa. Th is is the possibility of setting up an analogy between an argument about gender in Melanesia made by Marilyn Strathern (1988) , and of exploiting the analogy for drawing together analytically a broad range of ethnographic detail on human-animal relations in the region that are so far scattered in texts ostensibly concerned with other topics.
Th e potential for analogies between problems of feminist research and research on humananimal relations has already been noted (e.g., Hastedt 2011) . I suggest that a very specifi c analogy can be set up between the challenges of feminist anthropology in the 1970s and 1980s and the challenges of multispecies ethnography now. Anthropologist Marilyn Strathern in her Th e Gender of the Gift (1988) articulates and addresses the challenge for feminist anthropologists as one of "facing both ways. " Facing in the direction of a "radical politics, " they must seek to uncover gender inequality (Richards 1982 , cited in Strathern 1988 , including in their own analyses (e.g., Atkinson 1982; Strathern 1988: 37) . Facing in the direction of a "radical scholarship, " they will want to reveal these aspirations themselves to be grounded in historically specifi c conditions (e.g., Rosaldo and Lamphere 1974; Rosaldo 1980b) . Multispecies ethnographers similarly fi nd themselves facing both ways. On the one hand, there is a need for writing critically against the "anthropocene, " the infl ation of the human to planetary scales; on the other, we must avoid becoming engrossed with ourselves and give due attention to our connections with other species. As Kirksey and Helmreich write: "Multispecies ethnography involves … attending to the remaking of anthropos as well as its companion and stranger species on planet Earth" (2010: 549).
Strathern approaches the challenge of feminist anthropology by assuming a third position, between the political and the scholarly, as an ethnographer of Mount Hagen, in Papua New Guinea. She uses her Hagen ethnography as a starting point for a comparative analysis of gender in Melanesia and in the modern West, in which she moves back and forth between feminist and anthropological scholarly debates and ethnography. How exactly she does this, must be a question of some interest to multispecies ethnographers. Below, I try to outline one of her analytical strategies, step by step, and suggest how it may be re-employed in the development of multispecies ethnography in Melanesia and perhaps beyond.
Th e strategy I am interested in combines three analytical moves that can usefully be replicated in multispecies ethnography. Th e fi rst is training attention on an ethnographic instance that appears especially troubling, from the perspective of the double challenge. Th e second is Strathern's replacement of men and women with "same-sex" and "cross-sex" relations as key analytical categories, a move by which she guards against taking for granted the diff erence she sets out to investigate. Th e third is her integration of the term agency, which is central to feminist debates, into her analytical toolkit. In this way, Strathern anchors her argument closely in the feminist debates that provoked it, as well as in ethnographic observations of Melanesian concerns with action and its eff ects. I suggest that the term is equally useful for anchoring multispecies ethnography in Melanesian as well as various anthropological concerns. Eduardo Kohn, alluding to a diff erent but related analogy to the one that I perceive between multispecies ethnography and feminist anthropology, has made a comment on agency, among others, that expresses an intent similar to mine here: "the goal in multispecies ethnography should not be just to give voice, agency or subjectivity to the non-human … but to force us to radically rethink these categories of our analysis as they pertain to all beings" (cited in Kirksey and Helmreich 2010: 562-3) . For rethinking our analytical categories as they pertain to all beings, and with special reference to Melanesia, I propose building on Strathern's analysis of gender.
Th e appropriateness of doing so for developing a comparative approach to human-animal relations in Melanesia may be doubted on several grounds. First, the suggestion to use Strathern's writings as a conceptual resource for research on human-animal relations will likely be contentious, including among anthropologists working in Melanesia. Her writings have oft en been criticized as opaque, and they do not readily lend themselves to simplifi cation. Th e challenges of making them useful for a broader and multidisciplinary research community are thus considerable. A second, equally serious point of criticism from within Melanesian anthropology has been that the elegance and power of the arguments-not of the style of writing-have led researchers to replicate them uncritically, including in cases where ethnographic observations would have permitted diff erent theoretical conclusions (Scott 2007a) . As a result, there have been calls to break the dominance of those writings rather than extend their infl uence (see Scott 2007b) .
Th is article is structured, and my argument is developed with these reservations in mind. First, and especially for the benefi t of nonspecialist readers, one particular argument about gender contained in Th e Gender of the Gift is singled out for my purpose here, and a step-by-step exposition is provided in the following section. For the sake of simplicity, much of the history and context of this argument that specialist readers would be interested in is removed. Among other things, I can only acknowledge but not review here its development in the context of debates about sexual antagonism and women's roles in the Papua New Guinea highlands (see Bonnemère 1990; Buchbinder and Rappaport 1976; Godelier 2004; Herdt 1981; Herdt and Poole 1982; Langness 1967; Lindenbaum 1972 Lindenbaum , 1987 Meggitt 1964; Meigs 1976 Meigs , 1984 Read 1952 Read , 1954 Strathern 1972 Strathern , 1980 Strathern , 1984 Strathern , 1988 . Th e same holds for disciplinary debates about per son hood in the 1980s (e.g., Carrithers 1985; Geertz 1983; Rosaldo 1980a ) that Strathern addresses with reference to ethnographic fi ndings from Melanesia (see Leenhardt [1947] 1984; see also Battaglia 1983 Battaglia , 1990 Clay 1986; Cliff ord 1982; Goodale 1985; Munn 1986 ). Furthermore, I omit any reference to Strathern's writings on property, which are a continuation of her argument on gender utilized here and in which its critical potential becomes apparent (e.g., Hirsch and Strathern 2004; Strathern 1984 Strathern , 1998 Strathern , 1999 Strathern , 2001 Strathern , 2005 . With regard to the criticism of replicating theoretical fi ndings uncritically, this paper aims exactly in the opposite direction. Animals are not women. It cannot be suffi cient to import, in the form of basic analytical assumptions, theoretical conclusions pertaining to gender into research on human-animal relations. What can be adapted and developed further for this purpose is an analytical strategy that has proven productive for understanding relations among humans and relations between persons and things. It may also lead to novel insights into human-animal relations.
Furthermore, objections may be raised against my suggestion to retain agency as a key analytical term for comparative research into human-animal relations. Th e term poses dangers of reifi cation (Dwyer and Minnegal 2007) . It is also true that some anthropologists are currently exploring human-animal relations without relying on an explicit theory of agency, and that their research has been productive. A prominent example is Viveiros de Castro's "perspectivist" approach that has been taken up in debates about hunting in the circumpolar north (Viveiros de Castro 1998; see also Ingold 2000; Pedersen 2001; Willerslev 2007) . However, making agency central to human-animal debates off ers advantages that, in my view, outweigh the disadvantages, at least for the moment. In Melanesian anthropology, agency has long been and remains crucial to theoretical debates (e.g., Clay 1992; Dwyer and Minnegal 2007; Mosko 2001; Rio 2007) . Second, agency remains an important analytical term in anthropological research beyond Melanesia, notably in economic anthropology (see Maurer, Nelms, and Rea 2013) . By retaining and developing the term further for research on human-animal relations, the possibility for cross-fertilization between this research and equally timely debates will be enhanced (see also Rio 2005) .
Problems with Women: Laying out the Argument
For the purposes of this article, it is suffi cient to summarize, and to discuss the analytical strategy developed in Strathern's response to a particular challenge directed at her research (Josephides 1982 (Josephides , 1985 Strathern 1988: 145) . Josephides argued that research in Mount Hagen, in focusing on ceremonial exchange at the cost of household productive activities, bought into male informants' ideology of reciprocity. Josephides was most critical of the way in which the research concealed the source of the pigs that men exchanged among each other in the labor of women, and thus the alienation of women's labor. At one level, Strathern rejected the criticism. She has argued that the concept of alienation central to Josephides' argument presumed an "intrinsic relation between the self as subject and its realization in the objects of its activities, " and "entails a view of agents as single entities, as singular authors of what they make and do" (Strathern 1988: 162) . However, Hageners assume no such identity between women as subjects and pigs as their products. Pigs are coproduced by people in the household. Th us, when a man takes a pig out of the household for purposes of exchange, this is not a matter of one individual appropriating the product of another's labor. Th e analytical language is misplaced. At another level and more important, however, Strathern affi rms the relevance of the critical questions raised by Josephides. She places these questions in the context of feminist debates about women's agency, and asks what the concealment of one set of relations by another meant for this agency: did it become concealed, as well, and what conclusions could be drawn about the equality of men and women in Melanesia?
In order to demonstrate how Melanesian ethnography drove a wedge into assumptions about gender and agency (among others) deeply engrained in academic debates of the time, it is necessary to review Strathern's argument in the ethnographically specifi c terms in which it was made. Th e example of a man taking a pig out of the household for purposes of ceremonial exchange may serve as a starting point. As mentioned above, he does not alienate the product of his wife's labor, but he renders irrelevant, temporarily, the relations he has with her and others in the household. Strathern labels these relations "cross-sex. " Th ey are the (always particular) relations of mutual care among kin who collaborate and feed one another in the household. A woman grows tubers with her husband and children's well-being in mind. Th eir health is evidence of her care and "good thinking. " Her husband, in his turn, clears gardens for her. Th e tubers grown in these gardens thus evidence his work, as well as his wife's. Th e same holds for their children and pigs that eat the tubers. Th ey are the products of cross-sex relations.
Once in the domain of ceremonial exchange, a pig turns into evidence of relations of a different kind: the same-sex relations between men in ceremonial exchange. When looking at the pig about to change hands, the donor perceives his (generalized) capacity to give. Th e recipient, in turn, perceives-through the pig he obtains-his particular relation with the donor. He also anticipates giving it away again, thus anticipating-with the act of giving-his (generalized) capacity to give. Th is specifi cally male capacity is made visible again and again, and the samesex relations between men are thus replicated every time a pig is given and received. Men are not the only ones engaged in same-sex relations, in which one gender's capacities are replicated at each turn. Women do the same, according to Strathern, when they grow (female) tubers in the ground, or when they grow children inside themselves that reciprocally grow the mother's body (see also Gillison 1993) . Th ey replicate same-sex relations, and the capacity to grow that is specifi cally female.
For becoming evident, same-sex relations must yield a product: a woman's children must be born, and her tubers must be consumed. Likewise, the pigs that a man passes around in exchange only turn into evidence of his productive capacity once eaten. Men and women thus rely on one another to recognize the products of their respective capacities. However, those who recognize the products redefi ne their source in the process. Th ey perceive of themselves as the cause for whom the respective other produced a tuber, child, or pig. Th us, the circle closes.
Strathern acknowledges the inspiration, for this analysis, of the Hagen donor, who gives both ways. On the one hand, she presents an analysis of Melanesian gender relations that is anything but reductionist. Instead of assuming men and women as fi xed points, her analysis moves between same-sex and cross-sex relations, with each providing a vantage point from which to review the other. On the other hand, Strathern answers questions about equality in defi nite terms: men and women are valued equally as parties to cross-sex relations, in which each is the cause of the other's actions; they engage separately in same-sex relations in which the respective other's contributions are eclipsed; however, in the end, their particular gendered capacities, as men and women, can only become visible in the eff ects they have in the cross-sex domain. In the course of her analysis, she also exposes the points at which modern Western readers would inevitably assume inequality, while Hageners do not.
Going beyond the single case, Strathern makes her Hagen ethnography the centrepiece of a comparative argument on gender in Melanesia. In the process of working through a large amount of ethnographic detail, she develops a highly refi ned analytical vocabulary. Th e contrast between cross-sex and same-sex relations introduced above is crucial; beyond that, she uses the term agency to contrast feminist concerns with those of Melanesians. In the modern West, agency is located in individual subjects that act upon objects, and this assumption underpins feminist critiques of the objectifi cation of women (e.g., Nussbaum 1995) . In Melanesia, how-ever, agency is an attribute of cross-sex and same-sex relations. In cross-sex relations, men and women alternately stand to each other as "agent" and "cause" of an action; each acts with the respective other in mind. In same-sex relations, agency remains a generalized capacity that is elicited by (similar) others: male exchange partners elicit a man's capacity to give; children and tubers conceived of as female elicit a mother's nurture. Th e eff ect can only be made visible-and is turned into something else in the process-as a particular outcome of cross-sex relations.
From Gender to Species: Setting up an Analogy
If cross-sex relations are not simply relations between men and women whose gender can be taken for granted, but are diff erentiated from same-sex relations on the grounds of particular ethnographic observations, then human-animal relations are not simply relations between humans and animals. Th ey need to be established ethnographically. An example we can use for this purpose is ready at hand: Strathern's description of relations between humans and pigs that is contained in the argument summarized above. Th is description also provide a convenient entry point into an exploration of multispecies relations in Melanesia because of its obvious shortcomings, from this perspective. It does not address either side of the challenge of multispecies ethnography: it neither pays careful attention to the boundaries of the human in Hagen, nor does it give due attention to the pig.
Pigs, unlike men and women, are neither causes nor agents in Strathern's descriptions, or in their relations with the humans who grow and exchange them. Much the same may be said about other ethnographies that describe pig exchange in the Papua New Guinea highlands, regardless of other diff erences and disagreements (e.g., Brown 1978; Feil 1984; Lederman 1986; Meggitt 1965 Meggitt , 1977 A. Strathern 1971; Sillitoe 1979) . Th ey are all written with a human bias, and, to paraphrase Josephides' criticism, buy into the human ideology of pig exchange. Th ey confi ne themselves to asking what humans want to know when pigs change hands: Who did this? Who was the cause of the man's original removal of the pig from the household? Who caused him to act as a donor in a particular exchange? Note that it is always another human, and not a pig that is seen to cause a person to act. Pigs merely facilitate the reproduction of relations among humans, by human agents and causes. Th e same human bias can be detected in analyses that shift attention from exchange to pig-rearing and to the husbandry and hunting of the animals (see Sillitoe 2003) . In the end, it is humans who manage animals, and human purposes (relations among humans) for which the animals are used. Pigs, in these relations, are neither agents nor causes. Th e harder we try to specify pigs' role in human relations, for instance by suggesting that they are "secondary agents" (Gell 1998 ) through which human primary agents work, the deeper we seem to become entangled in arguments in which the agency of animals appears as a defi cient version of human agency. Th is, of course, is exactly what multispecies ethnographers would want to avoid.
As an alternative, I suggest that we take as a positive observation what I have so far rendered in negative terms. If pigs, in the relations that Strathern analyses, merely appear to be used for human purposes, then perhaps these are human same-species relations. Pigs are neither agents nor causes, just as women are neither agents nor causes in (male same-sex relations of) ceremonial exchange. What, then, would a species analogy to cross-sex relations look like? Because it is diffi cult to read between the lines of others' ethnographies, especially if they are written with a diff erent purpose in mind, I use my own ethnographic observations for providing a preliminary answer to this question, from which other ethnographic instances then come into view. Th ese observations concern fi shing, the most important subsistence activity and a favorite pastime on Pororan Island in northern Bougainville, in the far east of Papua New Guinea. Once they are on land, the Pororans put fi sh to use for human ends, just as Hageners do with pigs. However, while at sea, relations of diff erent qualities emerge. I draw on Pororan accounts of hook-and-line fi shing from a canoe in the lagoon and in the reef passages, in which both men and women engage, during the day or at night. Th e accounts were collected and are supported by observations on Pororan Island in 2004 and 2005. According to their own accounts, the Pororans take a deliberately random approach to fi shing, in response to their perceptions of uncertainty inherent in this activity. Th ey fi nd it diffi cult to predict the movements of fi sh, or the conditions at particular fi shing spots that change with the currents, the weather, the tides and by season. One woman highly regarded for her success in fi shing once explained that, instead of trying to plan a trip, she enjoyed "going around at sea, " oft en zigzagging, checking this spot and that and discovering new ones as she went along. By "just trying, " she would oft en "bump into" fi sh. She explained that this approach worked because fi sh, too, "go around at sea" looking for food, much like the islanders. Th ere are many fi sh around the reef and in the lagoon, yet Pororan fi shers narrate each particular encounter with a fi sh as an unexpected event. Th ey dwell on their surprise when feeling a tug on the line, followed by a moment of anticipation in which they try to guess from its movements what kind of fi sh it might be. Th is moment of anticipation gives way to some moments of "proper thinking" once the fi sh is in the canoe: the fi sher thinks of the people back on the island who will want to eat the fi sh and decides to whom to give it. However, these thoughts disappear when the fi sher prepares the next string, or picks up the paddle to "just try" another fi shing spot.
Two elements of these descriptions are striking. Th e fi rst are the random movements that people and fi sh perform at sea, that the Pororans contrast with ordinary movements at the village, and that momentarily create symmetry, and indeed similarity between fi sh and people. Th ese movements also create a strong sense of uncertainty, certainly for the humans involved. Fishers describe this uncertainty in terms of excitement about the possibilities ahead when fi shing on the reef; when they use methods targeting larger species, excitement may be mixed with anxiety. Th e Pororans also replicate these movements, and deliberately evoke the uncertainty associated with them, in certain moments in their interactions with other humans, most importantly, in a ritual performed aft er the death of a person of rank. Furthermore, random movements and collisions with marine species evoke a Pororan origin story, and vice versa (Schneider 2012) .
Th e second noteworthy element in Pororan accounts of fi shing are their descriptions of the moments in which fi shers and fi sh "bump into" one another, at which the random movements come to a halt and the symmetry and similarity between people and fi sh disappear. Fishers like to exaggerate, in retelling these moments, the radical change that occurs when the fi sh makes its presence known by tugging on the hook and when it emerges from the water as a particular (animal) Other. Once in the canoe, it brings to mind more remote particular others, the humans who will want to eat it. Th e words that the Pororans use when narrating human-fi sh encounters evoke sequences of ritual events that are described in the same terms, and vice versa.
Let me make the analogy to Hagen gender relations explicit. While Strathern distinguishes between male and female same-sex and cross-sex relations in the analysis of gender summarized above, species relations in Pororan fi shing could, provisionally, be labeled cospecies (coexistence while "going around" on the reef); cross-species (direct interaction between agent and cause, separated by the fi shing line), and human same-species (fi sh in the boat extending a human agent's capacity for action). While the terms are cumbersome, the imbalance is revealing. On the one hand, I am in no position to specify, based on my ethnographic data, what fi sh same-species relations would be on the reef around Pororan. Th is question will require future attention. On the other hand, androgynous gender, the analytical equivalence of cospecies rela-tions, appear as preconditions to human action in Strathern and others' accounts, in the form of undiff erentiated bodies of children and pigs and in origin stories (see Leach 2003; McKinnon 1991; Mimica1988; see also Wagner 2001) . Unlike the transformation of children into persons capable of engaging in (human) relations, and unlike the transformation of origin states, the transformation of pigs into objects in human exchange occurs so rapidly that we miss what the Pororans dwell on when talking about fi shing: the importance of cospecies relations, and their transformation in cross-species relations. Co-species relations, too, must be investigated as an outcome and precondition of (not necessarily human) action, along with the (human) actions that sustain and transform human same-species (cross-sex and same-sex) relations. Th is takes me to Strathern's second analytical move that is worth replicating in research on species relations.
Asking about Agency: Multispecies Ethnography in Melanesia
In this section, the characteristics of species relations and their transformation that one can detect in Pororan accounts of fi shing are used as an ethnographic starting point from which to identify comparable cases that would lend themselves to (re)analysis by multispecies ethnography. Strathern's turn to agency is used to suggest how these cases may be explored, and how comparative analysis may proceed. Th is, of course, is making only minimal use of the term's potential. It could be used, as well, in order to anchor these cases in broader debates, academic and public. I can only note this possibility, and the challenge that lies in it. An attempt to explore it further would exceed the scope of this article.
Th e ethnographic sources introduced here may give nonspecialist readers an indication of the rich ethnographic material available on human-animal relations in Melanesia. Th e examples selected demonstrate, fi rst, how much detail on these relations can be culled from texts not explicitly concerned with such analysis. Second, I show how a focus on questions of the agency in cospecies, cross-species and same-species relations may draw together material contained in texts whose divergent theoretical orientations pull the data apart.
Staying as close to Pororan fi shing accounts as possible, we may consider fi shing activities in other ethnographic settings as an obvious place to look for other instances of cospecies and cross-species relations, and for their transformation into same-species ones. Unfortunately, Hviding's (1996: 4) comment about the lack of research on fi shing, compared to land-based activities, remains valid. Th e evidence from ethnographies that do describe fi shing in some detail suggests signifi cant contrasts in this respect between ethnographic settings. Rutherford's (2003) accounts from Biak, West Papua indicate close parallels to fi shing on Pororan, especially with regard to the element of surprise in fi shing activities. Hviding's own, in-depth accounts of fi shing in Marovo Lagoon in the Western Solomons seem to suggest that the Marovo seascape is pervaded by the concerns of the lagoon's traditional guardians, who "manage fi sh, " so to speak, rather than exposing themselves to surprise encounters with nonhuman others at sea, as the Pororans do. Although Hviding's ethnographic material on diving in Marovo may perhaps be interpreted diff erently, the overall contrast appears stark (Hviding 1996: 202-4) .
Th e contrast might be accounted for narrowly, in terms of divergent population histories between Marovo and Pororan and the transmission of oral, partly restricted fi shing knowledge. More productive is a broader approach that asks how ethnographically observable diff erences in species relations can be linked with contrasts in the same-species human domain. Questions about agency, that is, about the reproduction and transformation of the three kinds of species relations by the actions of those who participate in them, provide a means of establishing such a link. It should be possible to connect through it, and to analyze systematically contrasts (between Pororan, Marovo, Biak, and potentially other settings) that can be gleaned in available ethnographic descriptions and analyses of myth, ritual activities, history, subsistence, and environmental change. In the process, assumption about agency, humans, and animals should become apparent, and could then be critically reviewed. To this end, the comparison between species relations internal to the material could also be complemented with a comparison of another set of relations, involving yet other agents: conservationists, who establish relations with both humans and fi sh in Melanesia.
Besides the sea, another obvious setting for studying human-animal relations in Melanesia is forests. Since the 1970s, a rich and diverse set of ethnographies with diff erent ethnographic and theoretical foci has emerged on the people in the Mount Bosavi and Southern Highlands area in Papua New Guinea (see Dwyer 1990; Feld [1982 Feld [ ] 2012 Kelly 1993; Knauft 1985; Schieff elin 1976; Weiner 1988 Weiner , 1991 Weiner , 2001 ). Many of these texts have become highly infl uential in their respective subfi elds. I demonstrate how the wealth of detail on human-animal relations contained in them may be drawn together, through an analytical focus on questions of agency, and how it could stimulate an analysis that attends to other species, as well as critically reviewing the boundaries of the human.
Perhaps the most highly acclaimed text from this ethnographic area is Steven Feld's Sound and Sentiment ([1982] 2012), a study of the acoustic relations between humans (Kaluli) and birds. In the introduction to the third edition, the author describes the further development of his Bosavi research project: "I wanted to have a new all-species way to talk about the emplaced copresence and corelations of multiple sounds and sources" ([1982] 2012: xvii). Beyond noting the general relevance of this research in the broader context of research on human-animal relations, I am interested in Feld's choice of the terms copresence and corelations, which off er leads for a multispecies perspective. Th ey indicate a concern with ethnographic moments and relations very diff erent from those characterized by intense attention to (human) others as the causes for one's action.
Th is intense attention to human others is the subject matter of Edward Schieff elin's research with the Kaluli, which complements Feld's. Schieff elin's (1976) ethnography focuses on the gisaro, the ritual in which the songs analyzed by Feld play a crucial role. Th e gisaro is a ritual held at night in the longhouse, oft en on important occasions such as a major ceremonial exchanges. In the ritual, four dancers among a larger group of visitors, decorated as birds, dance to and sing songs that evoke memories of the host group's recently deceased. Th ey move the audience to such extreme emotions that spectators jump up and burn the shoulders of the dancers with torches. Aft er the ritual, the dancers pay compensation to those whom they caused to weep. In selecting a single ceremony as a focus for understanding how meaning is generated in particular sequences of ritual events, Schieff elin follows Bateson's (1958) thrust and strategy. He is primarily interested in understanding reciprocity as an emergent outcome of the "opposition scenario" (Schieff elin 1976: 107-16) of the gisaro, which transforms an original diff erence, established by the loss of one group, and which culminates in the dancers paying their hosts compensation for causing them to weep.
Feld's and Schieff elin's writings demonstrate the potential that research from the Mount Bosavi area holds for studying the ethnographically specifi c boundaries of the human, while giving due attention to animals. One focuses on the corelations of humans and birds in the forest; the other, on the emergence of what might be called same-species human relations. Th e ethnographic link lies in the acoustic relations between humans and birds. However, for a project in multispecies ethnography that would go beyond sound, a theoretical link is missing between Feld's research, inspired by phenomenology (among others), and Schieff elin's, which builds on the processual impulse of Bateson's work but turns it into a narrowly social direction. Establishing this link would be important from the perspective of Schieff elin's research, as well as of Feld's, and may allow researchers interested in human-animal relations to draw the wealth of their data together and into a novel fi eld of research.
Schieff elin's emphasis on the opposition scenario and the establishment of reciprocity in the gisaro-the dancer moving the audience, the audience torching the dancer, and the payment of compensation-fails to account for some details of the performance that he describes with great intensity. Among them is the signifi cance of the movement of the dancer "refl ecting the motions of man, of waterfalls, and of the forest" (Schieff elin 1976: 178) . Furthermore, there are various indications of a nonoppositional relation between audience and dancers, or hosts and guests, which is more prominent in other ethnographic accounts of related rituals (see Knauft 1985; see also Dwyer 1990; Kelly 1993) . I suggest that we may take the dancers' movements as an indication of cospecies relations at work that cannot be explained in terms of the same-species human concerns. Instead, we could specify how these cospecies relations are created, reproduced, and transformed into cross-species, and eventually into same-sex human relations of opposition, and vice versa. Th e gisaro is a multispecies event.
If the gisaro can be understood better when examined through the multiplicity of species relations at work, then the same may hold for human-bird relations in the forest. We may ask, for instance, how Kaluli acoustic knowledge of the forest helps them catch birds, whose feathers then enhance the appearance of the human dancers in the gisaro. Detailed ethnographic material on hunting is available for a neighboring people, the Etoro or Etolo (Dwyer 1990; Kelly 1993) , and raises further questions for multispecies ethnography. For example, Dwyer (1990: 195-96) suggests that the opposition scenario, which Schieff elin had detected in the Kaluli gisaro, underpins the new, Christian celebrations that have replaced the Etolo version of this ritual, as well. However, although Dwyer can still report Etolo reminiscences of waiting in ambush for the feather of the bird-of-paradise to decorate dancers for their equivalent of the Kaluli gisaro, he could not observe the hunting of the birds itself, as the Christian rituals required no feathers. Th is raises interesting questions about connections between subsistence, religious change and multispecies relations.
Spinning the thread further (and leaving the Mount Bosavi area for the sake of making a more general point): bird feathers travel along far-fl ung trading networks, and they are used in decorations for dances not only by the Kaluli, but also by other highlands peoples. For Hageners, detailed ethnographic information is available on their evaluation of the eff ects of the secondary agency of these feathers, in strictly human terms . Furthermore, feather of the bird-of-paradise enhanced the appearance of non-Melanesian agents in the early twentieth century, when they were fashionable on hats in Europe and North America (Kirsch 2006a) . Th ese feathers were outcomes of, as well as conditioning actions of humans and birds across vast geographical distances and across analytical scales. Finally, the same birds have also fi gured prominently in conservation projects, in which Melanesian and Western stakeholders are negotiating their signifi cance (West 2006) . Th e wealth of ethnographic material on humanbird relations is available but widely dispersed, and requires a powerful analytical strategy to draw it together, and to link the various debates to which its analysis could contribute. I suggest gathering, by ethnographic "partial connections" (Strathern 2004 ), descriptions of co-species, cross-species and same-species, and examining their reproduction and their transformation into and out of each other.
Th e suggestion of incorporating into a single analysis, and specifi cally one of agency, ethnographic detail across the full length of multispecies relations, from moments of copresence in the forest to the generation of reciprocity, will likely be contentious. Specifi cally, it appears to oppose arguments put forward by James Weiner (1991 Weiner ( , 2003 with reference to ethnographic observations among the Foi, north of the Kaluli. In an early analysis of Foi sociality, Weiner (1988) had relied heavily on an analytical approach developed by Roy Wagner ([1967] 1981, 1986) , which is closely related in spirit and strategy to that of Marilyn Strathern. In more recent writings, Weiner complemented this approach by drawing on an eclectic range of inspirations, but most important phenomenology, in order to uncover what, as he argued, the analytical language he had used before could only cover up. Rather than suggesting a return to an analytical language that has proven insuffi cient, I suggest its critical reworking through the ethnography that seems least amenable to its terms. With Kohn, I suggest rethinking agency in response to the challenge that multispecies relations pose. Weiner's ethnographic descriptions and analyses provide rich material for beginning such rethinking. Th ey draw attention to two dimensions of multispecies relations in the Southern Highlands, in addition to ritual and sound: metaphor and myth. For instance, Weiner's analysis of a myth about the origin of pearl shells, important wealth items for the Foi, in which birds play a prominent role seems to suggest possibilities of exploring, through myth, exchange as a multispecies relation (Weiner 1988: 276-78) . Tracing highlands exchange networks with an eye to such relations, all the way back to Hagen pigs, would be an intriguing task.
It should be noted that other areas besides Mount Bosavi have been studied extensively by anthropologists, whose rich descriptions and analyses could be reviewed with an eye to humananimal relations contained in them, but partly hidden behind other research interests. One area worth mentioning briefl y is the Mount Ok area, in the far west of Papua New Guinea (see Barth 1975; Craig and Hyndman 1990; Crook 2007; Kirsch 2006b; Robbins 2004) . Another is the area around Mount Kare (e.g., Biersack 1999; Clark 1993; Haley 1996; Stewart and Strathern 2002) . In both locations, dynamics of myth, subsistence, resource extraction, and religious change have been explored, and the sources would lend themselves to exploration from the perspective of multispecies ethnography.
Conclusion
Th e aim of this article has been to draw attention to the potential that ethnographic and analytical resources from Melanesian anthropology hold for the further development of research on human-animal relations in Melanesia, and in anthropology. Th e context in which a review of this potential appears most immediately relevant is recent developments in multispecies ethnography, a relatively new and open-ended undertaking that anthropologists working in Melanesia, among others, are becoming increasingly interested in.
With respect to analytical potentials, I have seized on an analogy that may be perceived between a fundamental challenge that inspired feminist anthropology in the 1970s and 1980s, and one that multispecies ethnographers face today: to take a critical stance against something (male domination, the infl ation of the human) without losing one's intellectual curiosity about the phenomenon at issue (gender, species relations). Marilyn Strathern has both contributed to clarifying the challenge of developing a feminist anthropology and addressed it convincingly, in a comprehensive comparative study on gender in Melanesia. Multispecies ethnographers might learn from her approach, and from its limitations as well as its strengths, which have been discussed controversially in Melanesian anthropology and beyond.
One advantage of trying to think about what multispecies ethnography might look like through the lens of Strathern's work on gender is that the analytical language is precise. Th is allows multispecies ethnographers to perform parallel analytical moves to hers, register the diff erences in outcome, and detect in these diff erences important contrasts between gender relations and species relations as analytical fi elds. Th ere are limitations to the analogy, including practical ones. Some of the terminology that I have borrowed, including "cross-species" and "cospecies, " will need adjustment, with reference to a proliferation of terms for analyzing human-animal relations that are still in the process of consolidation. Th e more diffi cult, longterm but potentially rewarding task will be to refi ne agency by using it as a tool in multispecies ethnography.
Th e second aim of this article-to draw attention to rich available data on human-animal relations in Melanesian ethnographies-has been complicated by the pursuit of the fi rst. Strathern's second analytical move displaces the target. While the appearance of animals in ethnography may be a good fi rst indication that human-animal relations are at issue, focusing on these alone may conceal more than it reveals about the extent of these relations, about their significance in a variety of situations and settings, and about the novel connections between the latter that become apparent from a multispecies perspectives. I have chosen to make this point with reference to ethnographic sources from a small area only. Th is has come at the cost of omitting reference to a wealth of other material. Th e benefi t, I hope, is that readers may have acquired a position from which to perceive multispecies relations in material they are familiar with from other contexts, and from which they may appreciate both the scope and the potential of this exciting research fi eld. Ⅲ KATHARINA SCHNEIDER, PhD, is an assistant professor of anthropology at Heidelberg University.
